South Africa and the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture: Old Responsibilities and New Challenges by Akokpari, John
28
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
 e-ISSN 2448-3923 | ISSN 2448-3915 | v.1, n.2, Jul./Dec. 2016 | p.28-47
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN 
UNION’S PEACE AND SECURITY 




The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was officially replaced by 
the African Union (AU) in July 2002. As the largest regional body, the AU 
was tasked with uniting the continent and promoting Africa’s development. 
One of the reasons for the demise of the OAU was its demonstrated 
inability to adapt to the global changes taking place after the Cold war and in 
particular to respond to the new set of challenges and opportunities facing 
the continent. These challenges include Africa’s marginalisation in the 
global economy, its growing international indebtedness, as well as domestic 
constraints such as HIV/AIDS, governance and, more crucially, internal 
conflicts. The OAU remained largely invisible on these issues, and as Packer 
and Rukare noted, the organisation was only “discussed for many years 
within and outside its headquarters in Addis Ababa” (Packer and Rukare 
2002, 365). The failures of the OAU in a new global context rendered it 
obsolete. There was thus popular expectation within the continent for the 
AU to become more assertive and to succeed where the OAU failed. To 
distinguish itself from the failings of its predecessor, the AU put a peace and 
security architecture (PSA) in place aimed at preventing, but also managing 
conflicts, which became a defining feature of Africa’s political economy. 
While the AU’s PSA has been hailed for providing a new approach to peace, 
security and governance, it was criticised for its incapacity to surmount the 
many challenges facing it, including the failure of some member states to 
fully support AU resolutions. In some instances, some countries openly 




contradicted the stance of the AU.
This paper highlights the challenges facing the AU’s PSA. It notes 
that one of these challenges is the contradictory position of South Africa on 
some of the peace and security decisions of the AU, including the disputed 
election results of the Ivory Coast presidential election of November 2010, 
and the Libyan crisis in March 2011. The paper argues that the AU also 
faces challenges relating to inadequate funds and the reluctance of member 
states to readily contribute troops for peacekeeping operations (PKOs). 
Together, these challenges vitiated the efforts of the AU to speedily resolve 
conflicts and other threats to regional peace and security. In addressing this 
and related issues, the paper underscores Africa as a theatre of conflicts. 
Next, it outlines the key features of the AU’s peace and security architecture, 
and then highlights the challenges facing the peace and security project. 
The conclusion summarises the main points in the paper.
Africa: the continent of conflicts
The scale and frequency of Africa’s conflicts are too familiar to be 
recounted. However, suffice it to say that no fewer than 80 conflicts were 
recorded in Africa between 1960 and the early 1990s (Adedeji 1999, 3), 
many of which occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War. Moreover, a 
majority of the conflicts were intra-state. In spite of the global decrease in the 
number of inter-state wars after the Cold War, Africa has seen an increase 
in the number of intra-state conflicts (Goodhand 2006, 79). For example, 
Laremont observed that only two – the Chad/Libya and the Rwanda/
Uganda – wars were interstate among the total of 16 wars that occurred 
on the continent between 1990 and 1997 (Laremont 2002, 3). While intra-
state conflicts continue to proliferate, the only full-scale inter-state conflicts 
since the dawn of the new millennium were the Ethiopian-Eritrean border 
war, which continues to re-erupt intermittently and, until 2011, the North 
and South Sudan conflict. The ubiquity of conflicts in Africa was further 
revealed in the fact that while 13 percent of the world’s conflicts were fought 
in Africa in the 1960s, this figure escalated to 35 percent by the beginning 
of the 21st century. 
Africa’s notoriety as a leading theatre of conflicts is revealed, 
moreover, in the fact that it currently hosts the largest UN peacekeeping 
contingent of about 22,492 (made up of troops, police, military observers 
and UN volunteers) in the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC – 
MONUSCO  (United Nations 2016). The mutiny of soldiers loyal to Bosco 
Ntaganda, a former general of the Congolese military in April 2012, and 
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the continuing instability in Eastern DRC where rebel Ntaganda is based, 
does not suggest the withdrawal of MONUSCO anytime soon. The UN also 
maintains a hybrid AU-UN force (UNAMID) in Darfur, Sudan, which by 
January 2016 numbered 21,022 (ibid); and a stabilisation force of 7,120 in 
the UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire - UNOCI (ibid). As well, the AU Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM) had a paltry force of 5,000 by August 2011, before the 
figure was augmented by Kenyan troops, who entered Somalia in September 
2011 in pursuit of Al-Shaabab militants suspected of being behind the spate 
of kidnappings and bombings in Kenya and parts of East Africa. 
Equally remarkable, about Africa’s intra-state conflicts, is the 
upsurge in the use of child soldiers on battle fronts. The conflicts in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, the DRC and the rebel war in northern Uganda involving the 
Joseph Kony-led Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan national 
army, have all involved the use of child soldiers. At the height of the Sierra 
Leonean conflict between 1992 and 1996, for example, an estimated 4,500 
children, many of whom were 14 years or younger, were forcefully recruited 
by the Revolutionary United Front – RUF (Skinner 1999, 10). Similarly, in 
Northern Uganda children between the ages of 10 and 18 were routinely 
abducted by the LRA and used as soldiers, while girls were used as “comfort 
women” (MacMullin and Loughry 2004). Other features of Africa’s conflicts 
have been the systematic rape, which rebels often visit on women; the 
inhumane maiming and amputation of civilian limbs (Laremont 2002, 14) 
as well as the growing incidences of HIV/AIDS infections among soldiers 
and rebels (Ndinga-Muvumba 2008). The increasing use of terrorist tactics, 
such as scotched earth methods, the use of explosives against soft targets 
especially civilians, has become new defining features of conflicts in Africa. 
Militant fundamentalist groups, including Al Shaabab in Somalia and Boko 
Haram in Nigeria have in the last few years resorted to the systematic use 
of terror against the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Nigerian 
population respectively. These conflicts have led to deaths, destruction of 
property, the weakening of the already fragile institutions of governance, 
and a massive threat to peace and security. 
While the reality and wider implications of conflicts for Africa’s 
peace and security are beyond dispute, the causes have elicited a wide 
range of explanations. A popular explanation of Africa’s conflicts has been 
linked to the struggle over the state and resources. Goran Hyden notes that, 
Africa’s conflicts are increasingly over natural resources (Hyden 1992, 2). 
Accordingly, Africa’s conflicts are now increasingly referred to as “resource 
conflicts.” Other observers attribute the causes to political and governance-
related factors such as neopatrimonialism, corruption, poor leadership, 
disrespect for human rights and democracy (Guest 2004), while others 
31
John Akokpari
trace the causes to economic adversities and poverty (Adekanye 1995; Brown 
1995). Other analysts, too, link it to the partisan posture of the state and its 
tendency to marginalise certain communities, which leads to irredentism 
and secessionist sentiments (Adam 1995; Adejumobi 2001; Akokpari 
2008) while yet others view African conflicts as reflecting contestation 
over farming and grazing lands and other diminishing environmental 
resources. These analysts refer to Africa’s conflicts as essentially “eco-wars” 
(Suliman and Omer 1994). Further, others see conflicts as a reflection of the 
fragility of the African state and the pervasiveness of ethnic politics (Copson 
1994). The rise of religious fundamentalism has also become a new cause 
of conflicts in Africa. These various perspectives underscore the complexity 
of the causes of Africa’s conflicts and the illusiveness of a single causal 
explanation. 
A visible failing of the OAU has been its inability to address issues 
around governance whose effects often resulted in conflicts. Poor governance 
was reflected in the emergence of authoritarian and largely unaccountable 
leaders, who were not only corrupt but who also systematically abused 
human rights with impunity. Those who did not blatantly abuse human 
rights became sit-in or life presidents. These leaders flourished under 
the glaring eyes of the OAU. Many of these leaders fell from power either 
through popular revolts as was the case of Mengistu Harmiriam (Ehiopia) 
and Siad Bare (Somalia); military coup in the case of Kwame Nkrumah 
(Ghana); armed rebellion as in the cases of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now 
Democratic Republic of Congo-DRC) and Samuel Doe (Liberia); democratic 
elections as in the case of Kenneth Kauda (Zambia); or through natural death 
while in power such as were the cases of Gnassengbe Eyadema (Togo) and 
Sani Abacha (Nigeria). Typically, these leaders received no condemnation 
from the OAU. To be sure, the logic of the cold war was largely responsible 
for the persistence, even survival, of many of these leaders. As strategic 
allies of the chief cold war protagonists, these leaders were protected 
against popular revolts. For example, when in 1978 Mobutu’s regime was 
threatened by rebellion in the Katanga province, French and Belgium 
troops, supported by US, expeditiously came to his aid (Schatzberg 1997, 
80). Largely as a result of this strategic importance, the west turned a blind 
eye to corruption and human right atrocities committed by these leaders 
against their citizens. The abatement of the Cold war, however, attenuated 
the strategic salience of African regimes and some like Samuel Doe and 
Mobutu readily fell to rebels in 1991 and 1997 respectively. Not only did the 
OAU remain silent on governance issues, but it was also constrained by 
the old and discredited principle of “non-interference” in the OAU charter 
from intervening in conflicts. This posture was, however, to change under 
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the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture (PSA).  
The AU Peace and Security architecture
Recognising the central responsibility of conflicts and poor 
governance in the threat to peace and security, the Constitutive Act of the 
AU laid the foundations for a new security architecture on the continent. 
Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act lists the promotion of “peace, security, 
and stability on the continent” as one of the key objectives of the AU, while 
Articles 3(g) and 3(h) seek to promote democratic governance and human 
rights respectively. Thus, the Constitutive Act set the AU apart from its 
predecessor. Two provisions of the Constitutive Act particularly relevant to 
the PSA are Article 4(h) which, consistent with the UN’s doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), authorises the intervention of the Union in 
member states “pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”; 
and Art 4(j) which grants “the right of Member States to request intervention 
from the Union in order to restore peace and security.” These provisions, 
in contrast to the posture of the OAU, marked a fundamental positional 
shift of the AU from “non-interference to non-indifference” (Mwanasali 
2008). Moreover, the provisions underscored the AU’s determination to 
directly confront acts of impunity and incidences where the state becomes a 
source of threat to the security of its citizens (Akokpari 2011). Importantly, 
the interference clauses redefined sovereignty, stripping it of its previously 
absolute status and prioritising the security and safety of people over the 
territorial integrity of states. It was under the powers of Art 4(h) that the 
AU intervened in the conflicts in Somalia (2007), Darfur (2007) and Ivory 
Coast (2011), among other countries.
  A notable institution of the PSA is the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC), which was officially launched in May 2004. A key organ of the AU, 
membership in the PSC was a form of reward to countries which have been 
active in previous peace and security systems of the OAU. At the same 
time, membership also served as an incentive for countries to become 
more involved in the peace and security operations on the continent. Thus, 
as Adebajo Adekeye notes, membership is “based on four basic criteria: 
peacekeeping experience; capacity to pay; financial contribution to the 
AU’s Peace Fund; and constitutional governance commitment” (Adekeye 
2008, 133). The 15 members of the PSC were drawn from countries in each 
of the five sub-regions of the continent – North, South, East, West and 
Central Africa –pursuant to equitable regional representation. Ten of the 15 
members are elected for a two-year term, while the remaining 5 serve a term 
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of three years. While this arrangement ensured continuity, it was also a 
compromise between dominant states like South Africa and Nigeria, which 
wanted veto powers on account of their disproportionately bigger financial 
and material contribution to the AU on the one hand, and the broad range 
of countries who were opposed to the idea of veto. Thus, unlike the UN 
Security Council, no members of the AU PSC wield veto powers. Decisions 
on substantive issues are carried by a two-thirds majority vote. Generally, the 
PSC is to function like the UN Security Council in matters relating to peace 
and security. Article 7 of the Protocol on PSC mandates it to assume full 
responsibilities over issues relating to peace and security. This includes the 
prevention, resolution and management of conflicts and attendance to any 
issues that threaten regional peace and security (AU Protocol Establishing 
the Peace and Security Council, Art 2). 
The Protocol establishing the PSC provided for an African Standby 
force (ASF) to be composed of the Standby Brigades of the five sub-regional 
blocks. Each sub-regional brigade was envisioned to number between 3,500-
5,000 troops (Kent and Malan 2003: 76). In addition to military personnel, 
the ASF was also to have police and civilian segments and together number 
40,000 (Dersso 2009; Potgieter 2009). The PSC originally envisioned the 
ASF to be ready for rapid deployment to conflict spots by 2010. However, 
the ASF is yet to be assembled and the AU, meantime, has to call on states 
to contribute troops when needed. The deployment of the ASF is to be the 
responsibility of the PSC (Sarkin 2008, 59). In the exercise of its functions, 
the PSC is advised by the Council of the Wise, a five-member panel of 
eminent persons, who serve for a three year-term and are eligible for 
reappointment for a second term. Article 20 of the PSC protocol mandates 
it to involve civil society “actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, 
security and stability in Africa.” Other key institutions of the PSA include 
a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) under the PSC. The CEWS 
office is to use appropriate “early warning indicators” such as economic, 
political, humanitarian and military from countries, analyse these and 
carefully track situations and take appropriate measures to forestall 
the outbreak of conflicts (Cilliers and Sturman 2004). A Military Staff 
Committee (MSC) composed of the representatives of military top brass 
of countries constituting the PSC is established under the PSC. The key 
function of the MSC is to advise the PSC on issues of peace and security. 
A final institution under the PSA is the Special Fund to which member 
countries make mandatory and voluntary financial contributions. In 2011, 
the AU increased the mandatory contribution of member states to the fund 
from six to seven percent (Report of the Executive Council 2011).     
Equally worthy of note is the greater responsibility devolved to sub-
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regional organisations as part of the AU’s PSA. In retrospect, the idea of 
formalising the role of regional organisations in conflict resolution and 
peace building developed from former UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace. The Agenda called for burden sharing 
between the UN and regional organisations, especially in areas where the 
former was limited in its ability to maintain peace and security (United 
Nations 1992). In the Agenda, Boutros-Ghali underscored the importance 
of regional organisations as first responders to conflict as a way of reducing 
the peacekeeping burden of the UN. A subsequent UN Report expanded 
on the merits of using regional organisations in peacekeeping noting 
their “comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and 
settlement of conflicts and [in assisting] the UN in containing them” (United 
Nations 1995, 4). Boutros-Ghali’s proposal was bolstered by the Economic 
Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) successful intervention in 
the conflicts in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997 (Levitt 1998). The 
abatement of the cold war and Africa’s loss of strategic importance to the 
west was attended by a corresponding decline in the willingness of western 
governments to either lead or be involved in peacekeeping operations 
(PKOs) in Africa (Adekeye and Landsberg 2000). Thus, a new urgency 
was created for the AU to assume greater, if not full, conflict management 
responsibilities on the continent. Western governments are, however, willing 
as the cases of Ivory Coast and Libya showed, to instigate “regime change” 
in countries where incumbent leaders are perceived as acting contrary to 
international norms or as a hindrance to the foreign policy agenda of the 
west. In such situations, western governments are prepared to side-line the 
AU.
Ideally, while the use of regional organisations in peace keeping 
carry the danger of promoting the parochial interest of intervening 
countries, it is nonetheless seen as more advantageous than the use of 
an international force. Among other things, regional peacekeepers have 
better familiarity with the region, including its cultural, social and historical 
terrain, which make them more effective on the ground. This factor partly 
explains why, with its superior weaponry and military technology, the US 
failed to outgun Somali militias during the former’s intervention in 1993-4. 
Further, geographical proximity lessens the financial cost of intervention 
and peacekeeping by regional actors. Moreover, regional forces can be 
assembled much faster than a multinational force. Above all, the sheer 
desire to mitigate the associated effects of conflicts on the region in the 
form of refugee flows, gunrunning and weapon proliferation, as well as 
general insecurity make regional actors more committed to peacekeeping 
than extra-regional actors (Adekeye 2002, 16). While the advantages of 
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regional peacekeepers over extra-regional multinational forces is yet to be 
empirically demonstrated, it is fair to argue that ECOWAS’ successes in 
the interventions in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts were largely 
due to the unique advantage enjoyed by the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) as a regional peacekeeping force. Yet, while the AU and its sub-
regional organisations have shown a strong inclination towards regional 
peacekeeping, they face numerous challenges, which undermine the long-
term effectiveness of the AU’s peace and security initiative.
Challenges facing the Peace and Security Architecture of 
the AU
The old and perennial problem of inadequate finance and logistics, 
which afflicted the OAU, continues to undermine the AU and its PSA. In 
2011, the AUs budget stood at $260 million, which was grossly inadequate 
to cover its administrative costs, peacekeeping operations and the salaries 
of its 400-member staff. The entire AU budget of 2011 was smaller than 
the $645 million and $1.8 billion which the UN spent on UNOCI and 
UNAMID respectively between July 2011 and June 2012 (United Nations 
2012). Even so, AU members contributed only 40 percent of the budget, the 
larger percentage coming from the EU, the US and China (The Economist 27 
January 2011). The biggest source of the financial challenge is the inability 
of member states to pay up their yearly contributions. Five members – 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa – make the largest financial 
contributions. In 2011, these countries each contributed $15 million while 
the majority of member states paid much lesser amounts ranging from 
$160,000 to as little as $20,000 by Malawi (The Economist 27 January 
2011). This truncated ability of the majority of member to make significant 
contributions has been coupled with the increasing demand of the AU to 
assume greater peacekeeping duties on the continent.  
Related to financial constraints is the inadequate logistics at the AU’s 
disposal. AU peacekeepers are often poorly equipped and overstretched. 
Largely as a result of these constraints the AU has had to rely on external 
partners for finance and logistical support in its PKOs (Saxena 2004, 
186). The US and the European Union (EU) have been regular financial 
and logistical contributors to AU’s PKOs. The AU Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB) was financed almost entirely by South Africa in 2003 until financial 
contributions from the EU and the US came in 2004. For that operation, 
the EU contributed about €25 million while contributions from individual 
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EU countries brought in an additional €30 million towards AMIB. In 
addition to logistical support, the US and EU have contributed $220 million 
and €162 million respectively towards AMIS since the mission’s inception 
(African Union 2006, Frazer 2006). China has since 2000 been making 
contributions towards the AU’s conflict management efforts. In 2008, it 
donated $11 million and $1.8 million towards humanitarian assistance and 
peacekeeping efforts respectively in Darfur (World Savvy Monitor 2008). 
By the close of 2011, Beijing became the largest contributor to AU’s PKOs 
among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, although its 
personnel are principally deployed in non-combat roles, mostly as engineers 
and transport experts (Ayenagbo et al 2012). While helpful, regular reliance 
on extra-African financiers delays intervention and undermines the AU’s 
ability to resolve conflicts on its own terms (Akokpari 2011: 161). A further 
challenge is the hesitance, sometimes failure, of member states to pledge 
troops and where pledges have been made, fulfilment has been appalling. 
The AU has traditionally struggled to assemble peacekeepers for quick 
deployment to conflict zones. 
South Africa’s controversial stances: a new challenge to the AU’s PSA?
A new and creeping challenge to Africa’s PSA is the contradictory 
position of South Africa, a leading member of the AU, on crucial peace and 
security issues. In perspective, the crucial role of South Africa in Africa’s 
peace and security initiatives cannot be overemphasised. As noted already 
AMIB was initially funded mainly by South Africa. Although Ethiopia and 
Mozambique provided troops, the bulk of the AMIB forces were drawn 
from South Africa. Along with ECOWAS, South Africa also played a central 
role in the attempts to resolve the previous conflicts in the Ivory Coast. It 
hosted peace talks between the warring factions in both the Ivorian and DRC 
conflicts between 2003 and 2005 and helped broker ceasefire agreements. 
South Africa’s most recent conflict resolution/mediation efforts under the 
PSA of the AU were in Zimbabwe, Mauritania and Madagascar. In these 
countries the conflicts were successfully resolved although the peace 
remained tenuous. Pretoria’s contribution to the PSA of the AU is cannot 
be underestimated.   
 Many of South Africa’s recent peace efforts were initiated by Thabo 
Mbeki, whose involvement in continental peace negotiations cannot be 
seriously disputed. Mbeki has been key in the conflict resolution initiatives 
in the Ivory Coast conflict between 2003 and 2005, the DRC, Zimbabwe 
and has served as the chief negotiator in the Darfur and in the Sudan-South 
Sudan conflicts although as an envoy of the AU. As well, Mbeki has been 
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pivotal in repositioning Africa in the new global political and economic 
order under the auspices of the AU. Moreover, Mbeki was part of the 
brains that restructured the OAU into the AU (Tieku 2004), while his role 
in reordering governance on the continent has equally been remarkable. 
He was influential in the promotion of the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD), which among other things, is helping to improve 
upon human rights protection and good governance in Africa in return 
for western aid and investments; and the African Peer Review mechanism 
(APRM), which assesses a country’s progress towards democracy, human 
rights and good governance (Hope 2005). Mbeki has used diplomacy and 
tact in dealing with the AU and individual states. He mastered the art of 
dealing with African leaders, including such errant presidents like Robert 
Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Omar Al-Bashir (Sudan) to get them at least to the 
negotiating table with their opponents.
However, Mbeki’s soft and overly diplomatic approach has been 
criticised for failing to resolve conflicts. His quiet diplomacy approach in 
the Zimbabwean conflict failed to yield dividends (Akokpari and Nyoni 
2009). In spite of successfully brokering a peace deal between ZANU-
PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the 
form of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008, the resultant unity 
government between the two contending political parties remained fragile, 
and characterised by mutual suspicion. Moreover, human right abuses 
and unilateral appointments to key positions were made by ZANU-PF 
without consultation with the MDC as stipulated in the GPA. To add, Mbeki 
controversially tried to get the International Criminal Court (ICC) to revoke 
the indictment of Al-Bashir on war crime and crime against humanity 
charges on grounds that the arrest and prosecution of the Sudanese 
leader would complicate the resolution of the Darfur and the Khartoum-
Juba conflicts (Akokpari 2011). Mbeki’s soft and non-blame-apportioning 
posture was also evident in his failed mediation efforts in the Ivorian post-
election conflict in 2010 as an AU envoy. Typical of his style, Mbeki wanted 
a compromise position, possibly the formation of a Zimbabwe-styled power-
sharing government to include Alassane Ouattara and incumbent Laurent 
Gbagbo. The formation of a unity government was, however, contrary to 
the position of ECOWAS and the AU, which both called on Gbagbo to cede 
power after losing the polls. In spite of this, Mbeki never really led South 
Africa to openly contradict the collective position of the AU on critical 
peace and security matters. This was, however, not to be the position under 
his successor, Jacob Zuma on the Zimbabwean, Ivory Coast, and Libyan 
conflicts.  
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South Africa- a torn in AU diplomacy?
South Africa’s position on the Zimbabwean, Ivory Coast and Libyan 
crises raised questions around Pretoria’s neutrality as a mediator and 
about whether it truly represents Africa. It was widely thought that as a 
designated mediator by SADC in the Zimbabwean conflict, South Africa 
under Jacob Zuma would adopt a tougher and an uncompromising stance 
on Zimbabwe, in contrast to Mbeki’s largely ineffective quiet diplomacy. 
During his campaign for the presidency, Zuma became openly critical of 
Robert Mugabe, demanding that the people of Zimbabwe be allowed to 
freely elect their leader. However, on assuming office, the South African 
leader surprisingly retracted from his tough posture. Like his predecessor, 
Mr Zuma rather “broke bread” with Mr Mugabe much to the chagrin of 
the opposition MDC. In 2010, the president of the ANC Youth League 
(ANCYL), Julius Malema, then a close ally of Zuma, paid an official visit 
to Zimbabwe during which the ANCYL leader openly endorsed Mugabe 
as a legitimate leader while denouncing the MDC as a puppet of the West. 
Although the ANC eventually chastised Malema for his utterances, this did 
not convince the MDC that South Africa was an impartial mediator in the 
conflict. Meantime, the situation in Zimbabwe hardly improved as human 
rights violations were perpetrated by ZANU-PF against supporters of MDC, 
even with the establishment of the unity government in 2008 (Shaw 2011). 
Frustration with progress in Zimbabwe led MDC supporters and South 
Africans, who had hoped for the application of intense pressure on Mugabe, 
to question South Africa under Zuma as a neutral mediator.  
Although not directly involved as a mediator, South Africa’s 
position in the Ivorian conflict was equally controversial, if not oppositional 
to the stance of ECOWAS and the AU. The Ivory Coast conflict erupted 
when President Laurent Gbagbo who was widely believed to have lost the 
28 November 2010 presidential polls, refused to cede power to his rival 
Alassane Ouattara. While both ECOWAS and the AU were unanimous that 
Laurent Gbagbo had lost the election and were contemplating the use of 
force to enforce the will of Ivorians if he continued to cling on to power, 
South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite 
Nkoana-Mashabane, maintained that the outcome of the election was 
inconclusive (DIRCO 2011). This position emboldened the beleaguered 
Ivorian president to ignore calls to step down. ECOWAS and AU suspicion 
of South Africa’s support for Gbagbo was heightened when in January 2011, 
a South African naval frigate, the SAS Drakensberg, docked off the Coast 
of Ivory Coast. The position of South Africa and the presence of its war 
ship off the Ivorian coast were seen by ECOWAS as not only undermining 
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its authority but also countering the efforts of the AU at getting Gbagbo to 
cede power (Lynch 2011). Amidst mounting regional and international calls 
for him to quit, Laurent Gbagbo was emboldened to claim that he could 
still rely on seven of the 53 members of the AU including Angola, Uganda, 
South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, 
and Ghana (ISS 2011). It was widely suspected that South Africa’s position 
was partly responsible for the refusal of Gbagbo to cede power, hoping that 
divisions within the ranks of the AU members would weaken its resolve. 
The resulting impasse prolonged the violence in the country, which claimed 
over 3,000 lives and spawned thousands of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (Mail and Guardian 15 March 2012). The post-election conflicts 
was, moreover, characterised by massive human rights abuses believed to 
be perpetuated by forces loyal to both Gbagbo and Ouattara (Human Rights 
Watch 2011). Laurent Gbagbo was eventually arrested on 11 April 2011 by a 
combined force of opposition and French forces. 
If South Africa undermined regional efforts in the resolution of 
the Ivory Coast post-election conflict, it betrayed the AU on the Libyan 
crisis. As rebellion against Muammar Qaddafi gathered momentum in late 
2011, the AU proposed a roadmap to resolve the conflict. At the core of the 
roadmap were proposed talks between the beleaguered Libyan leader and 
rebels that would lead to democratic reforms. The roadmap was, however, 
rejected by rebels who maintained that Qaddafi should play no role in the 
future of the country. Meantime, civilian casualties were mounting while 
refugee flows from Libya were escalating. Led by France and Britain, 
Western governments proposed a no-fly zone to protect civilians in an 
apparent attempt to weaken Qaddafi’s ability to quell the rebellion. In the 
light of possible marginalisation in the resolution of the conflict, the AU 
resolved not to support any UN Security Council resolution that sought to 
use force or external military intervention of any sort in Libya. However, 
less than a week after the passing of the AU resolution, on 17 March South 
Africa, one of the 10 non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
surprisingly voted in favour of Resolution 1973. The resolution established 
a no-fly zone over Libya and also authorised NATO to use “all necessary 
measures” to protect civilians. South Africa’s support for the Resolution was 
disturbing for not only contradicting the collective position of the continent, 
but also seriously undermining the AU’s peace proposals for Libya. South 
Africa justified its support for Resolution 1973 on grounds of its concerns 
for protecting civilians (United Nations 2011). However, Pretoria ought to 
have foreseen that a resolution authorising the use of “all necessary means” 
was open to various interpretations and given the West’s obsession with 
“regime changes” in the South in the post-Cold War era, Resolution 1973 
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would provide both the context and pretext for the overthrow of Muammar 
Qaddafi. South Africa made frantic efforts to stop the NATO bombing 
once it began, by declaring that NATO’s bombing of Libya was an abuse 
of Resolution 1973 (Mail and Guardian 14 June 2011). However, it was too 
late - the irreparable damage had been done; the West had fully grabbed the 
opportunity it had been looking for to effect regime change in Libya. 
Implications of South Africa’s controversial stance
South Africa’s action had critical implication for the unity of the AU, 
but also for the organisation’s PSA. It might be plausibly argued that the 
inability of the AU to elect the Chair of its Commission – the topmost job in 
the continental body – on 30th January 2012 during its eighteenth Summit 
in Addis Ababa, might be linked to Pretoria’s controversial stance on the 
AU’s peace initiatives. The contest for the Chair of the AU Commission 
became a straight two-way race between Jean Ping, the Gabonese, who was 
elected in 2008 and who was seeking a second term and Nkosazana Dlamini 
Zuma, the South African Home Affairs Minister, who was challenging for 
the job. After three rounds of voting none of the candidates secured a two-
thirds majority vote needed for election. During the fourth round of voting 
Jean Ping still failed to secure two-thirds of the total votes after Dlamini-
Zuma withdrew. The impasse was unprecedented; the election of previous 
Chairpersons of the Commission – Amary Essy (Ivory Coast) 2002-2003; 
Alpha Oumar Konare (Mali) 2003-2008; and Jean Ping  2008-2012 - had 
never required second rounds of voting. In fact, there has never been two 
candidates contesting at a time. Consensus was always the norm with official 
voting legitimising the choice. Following the failure to obtain a winner, a 
new round of voting was scheduled for the next AU summit in mid-July 
2012. The weeks preceding the July summit saw increased lobbying of 
African states by the contending candidates. When votes were eventually 
cast on 14th July, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma won, polling 60 percent of the 
54 votes during the third round of voting (BBC 2012).
Some observers argued that the voting in January and July was done 
along linguistic lines with Anglophone Africa supporting Dlamini Zuma 
and Fracophone countries voting for Jean Ping (Cilliers and  Okeke  2012, 
1). It was also apparent that the linguistic divide was overlaid by regional 
divisions with SADC countries lining up behind Dlamini Zuma and 
ECOWAS members behind Jean Ping. Whatever the truth might be Jean 
Ping’s challenger ought to have won the contest during the January vote 
since no former Chair of the Commission has ever contested for a second 
term. The failure of the South African candidate to beat Jean Ping perhaps 
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highlighted Africa’s suspicion of South Africa, a suspicion heightened by 
Pretoria’s controversial stance on the crises in Ivory Coast and Libya. Without 
doubt Pretoria’s contradictory position on the Ivory Coast and Libyan crises 
raised uncomfortable questions about the direction it was likely to lead 
the continent. Some countries might have calculated that it would be too 
dangerous to entrust the top-most job of the continent into the hands of a 
country which did not seem to speak the same language as the rest of the 
continent. The failure of Dlamini-Zuma to win the contest in January 2012 
was therefore a rejection of South Africa’s leadership in the Commission. 
Given its tendency to follow a unilateral foreign policy different from the 
collective position of the continent, along with its affability with the West, 
the inevitable question that beamed in the minds of African leaders was 
whether Pretoria could be a trusted spokesperson of Africa on critical 
regional and international issues. 
The eventual election of Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma may have 
delivered the AU Commission chair, but may not have restored unity to 
the AU, nor could it be said to have forestalled potential problems for the 
organisation. On the contrary, the election of the South African candidate 
could be the beginning of more schisms and suspicions in the AU for a 
number of reasons. First, there is an unwritten agreement among AU 
members that the chairship of the AU Commission should not be contested 
by any of the leading member states – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and 
South Africa. This practice was similar to what obtained in the UN where 
the Secretary-General has never been elected from any of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. The election of a candidate from South 
African thus breached this long-standing gentleman agreement. Trouble 
and dissension could emerge if Nigeria which, like South Africa, makes 
huge contributions to the AU budget decides to contest for the office 
next time around. Second, South Africa’s cross-continent lobbying and 
the eventual election of Dlamini Zuma’s may suggest that the chairship 
of the AU Commission is guaranteed only for those countries with bigger 
financial muscles. This could potentially create a “coalition of the weak” 
who will constantly oppose the economically powerful member states, thus 
creating a new and disconcerting fault line in the AU. Importantly, the long-
standing election of AU Commission chair by consensus may have ended, 
paving the way for potentially divisive politics and damaging implications 
for AU’s PSA.  
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Conclusion
The African Union’s PSA was an innovation aimed at proactively 
tackling Africa’s seemingly intractable security challenges. The PSA was also 
to distinguish the AU from the OAU, which lacked any structured conflict 
management programme. In addition to the AU’s recognition of sub-
regional organisations as key partners in regional conflict management, the 
PSA was also characterised by such novel and security-enforcing institutions 
as the Peace and Security Council, the African Standby force, the Panel of 
the Wise, the CEWS, the Military Staff Committee and the Special Fund. In 
establishing the PSA, Africa showed a commitment and initiative, at least 
in theory, to confront the perennial conflicts on the continent. The PSA 
was thus ideally set to be an effective tool. However, it faced a number of 
challenges, not least of which included inadequate funding and logistics as 
well as the lack of sufficient troops for expeditious deployment to security-
threatened spots. Recently, however, the contradictory position of South 
Africa on the AU’s stance on the Ivory Coast and Libyan crises has added 
a new challenge to the list of the continent constraints. Not only did South 
Africa’s action deprive the AU of a united voice on serious security issues, 
but it also divided the organisation. This was partly seen in the widely 
publicised AU’s failure to elect the Commission’s chair in January 2012. 
Although the chair was eventually elected in July 2012, the combined effect 
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The African Union established a Peace and Security architecture to prevent and 
resolve conflicts, which have remained endemic on the continent. The initiative was 
also to distinguish the AU from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, 
which had an appalling record in conflict resolution. However, in addition to the 
familiar challenges of financial constraints and perennial conflicts, the PSA faces 
a new challenge in the form of contradictory postures by South Africa on critical 
security issues. Together, these challenges vitiate the ability of the AU to swiftly end 
conflicts. As well, South Africa’s contradictory positions on certain security issues 
undermined unity mong AU members. The latter was demonstrated in the initial 
lack of consensus in the election of the Chairperson of the AU Commission. 
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